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THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION*
PAUL R. HAYSt
VOLUNTARY labor arbitration, which received a great push from the National
War Labor Board, has maintained its position since the war. It is estimated
that of the 50,000 collective agreements now in effect in this country fully 95
per cent contain arbitration clauses. While the arbitration system ordinarily
proceeds without resort to the courts, such resort occurs sufficiently frequently,
and the in terrorem results of the existence of a possible resort to the courts
is a sufficiently important factor, to raise the question of the extent to which
the courts should participate in the arbitration process. Arbitration cannot
properly call upon the courts to rubber stamp whatever arbitrators may do.
If the processes of the courts are to be available to enforce arbitration, then
the courts must examine and pass upon what it is that they are enforcing. As
I shall point out, there are a number of aspects of labor arbitration in which
the courts should interest themselves. The most important of these is the award
itself, when the courts are called upon to enforce it.
The third of the famous Steelworker cases of 19601 involved the enforce-
ment of an award. Although the Court granted enforcement in Enterprise
Wheel, it said:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the col-
lective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand
of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words
manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to
refuse enforcement of the award.2
No great harm is done by applying a liberal rule as to arbitrability, if the court
carefully scrutinizes what the arbitrator later decides. Professor Wellington
has pointed out the difference between the two procedures, arbitrability and
enforcement, and has expressed the hope that the Supreme Court will "reex-
amine ana modify" the position it took in Enterprise and give effect to the
language I have quoted.3
*This article was originally the third of the Storrs lectures which were delivered at the
Yale Law School on November 16, 17 and 18, 1964. The title given to the series was:
"Labor Arbitration - A Dissenting View."
i-Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Here
the Court granted enforcement but subject to modification: further arbitration to deter-
mine the amount due. The other two were United Steelworkers v. American Manufactur-
ing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) and United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
2. Id. at 597.
3. Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 471.
483.84 (1962).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has clearly drawn the dis-
tinction between arbitrability, that is, the arbitrator's "jurisdiction" to hear
the case, and the subsequent action for enforcement of his award. 4 The court
held that certain limiting language in a collective bargaining agreement went
not to the arbitrator's "jurisdiction" but to his "authority" to make an award.
Should his decision or the remedy exceed the bounds of his authority as
established by the collective bargaining agreement, that abuse of authority
is remediable in an action to vacate the award.
5
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company0 the first
of the 1960 trilogy, the Supreme Court said that even a frivolous claim is
arbitrable because of the "therapeutic values"7 in the processing of all claims.
This does not mean, though, that an award based on a frivolous claim is en-
forceable in the courts. In New Bedford Defense Products Div. v. Local 1113,
UAW,8 a First Circuit case which is cited with approval in American Manufac-
turing,9 the district court held an issue arbitrable although it could be "cor-
rectly decided only one way."' 0 The appellate court likened the jurisdictioil
of'an arbitrator to that of a court and said:
If the subject matter of a claim is within the court's jurisdiction, the court
does not lose its jurisdiction because of the fact that the proper disposition
of the claim may be crystal-clear under the law.'1
Holding that such an. issue is arbitrable does not mean, I think, that an arbi-
trator's award should be enforced if he decided the issue in favor of the claim.
In the words of the Second Circuit, the arbitrator has jurisdiction to be wrong.
The question is whether he has authority to decide issues contrary to the pro-
visions of the contract.
The point I make may be illustrated by supposing a collective bargaining
agreement which provides: "The employer shall have unfettered discretion
under all circumstances, and as if no collective bargaining agreement existed,
to contract out whatever work he chooses." The union raises a grievance con-
cerning the employer's having contracted work out. Under the authorities it
appears that the grievance is" arbitrable if the union claims that it arises under
the agreement. Now let us suppose that the arbitrator awards in favor of the
union and writes an award in which he says "I have disregarded' the con-
tractual provision because I believe it to be unfair and inequitable. I have
preferred to dispense my own brand of industrial justice which appears to
me to be superior to the collective bargaining agreement." His award, says
4. Carey v. General Electric Co., 315 F2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U,S,
908 (1964).
5. 315 F.2d 499, 508.
6. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
7. Id. at 568.
8. 258 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958).
9. 363 U.S. 564, 568.
10. 160 F. Supp. 103, 112 (D. Mass. 1958).
11. 258 F.2d 522, 526.
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the Court, "is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity
to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the
award."' 2 The arbitrator would have jurisdiction to arbitrate the issue, but
no authority under the collective agreement to make such an award. Nor can
it be that the result depends on what the arbitrator says in his opinion. Sup-
pose instead of announcing that he was disregarding the contractual provision
he stated that he read it to prohibit all contracting out. Surely he would be
equally faithless to his obligation. Or he might say nothing about the contract
provision or even write no opinion. Has he not equally exceeded his authority?
A new confrontation between labor arbitrators and the courts is now de-
veloping. In-conformity with the instructions of the Supreme Court in the
famous Lincoln Mills case,13 the federal courts, with assistance from the state
courts, are fashioning a new federal law of collective agreements. The judges
whom the Supreme Court called upon for this work are the very judges
upon whose expertise, as compared with arbitrators, the Court threw so much
doubt in the Steelworker cases. 14 In cases involving the thousands of collective
bargaining agreements which contain no arbitration clause and in other cases
where for various reasons no resort is had to arbitration, these judges are
now deciding exactly the same issues that the arbitrators are deciding in
situations in which arbitration is provided by the collective bargaining agree-
ments. Among the issues decided recently by courts as a matter of federal
law are those involving severance pay,'8 right unilaterally to change hours
or work,16 discharges, 7 transfers,' 8 compulsory overtime,19 travel pay,- 0 va-
cation pay,2 ' seniority, - contracting out m going out of business and leasing
12. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
13. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
14. Note I supra.
15. Irwin v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 452 (Mo.), cert. dcnied,
375 U.S. 908 (1963); Monterosso v. St Louis Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 368 S.W.
2d 481 (Mo.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 908 (1963).
16. Harmon v. Marton Bros., 227 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1964).
17. Ibid.
- 18. Harmon v. Marton Bros., supra note 16.
19. Allied Oil Workers v. Ethyl Corp., 51 CCH Lab. Cas. If 19439 (5th Cir. 1965).
20. Harmon v. Marton Bros., supra note 16.
21. United Steelworkers v. Copperweld Steel Co., 230 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Pa. 1964);
Taylor v. Southern Pennsylvania Bus Co., 203 Pa. Super. 229, 199 A.2d 745 (1964).
22. Ries v. Evening News Ass'n, 370 Mich. 614, 122 N.V.2d 663 (1963); Markham
v. American Motors Corp, 22 Wis. 2d 680, 126 N.W.2d 753 (1964) ; Swank v. Amp Inc.,
411 Pa. 356, 192 A.2d 225 (1963) ; Zdonok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
23. UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962); Local 499, Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 224 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Ioa
1964).
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enterprise to employees, 24 effect of decertification on recognition clause,2 and
retroactivity of wage adjustment.26 These are common garden variety griev-
ances which are also being decided every day by arbitrators. The courts will
thus be faced with the anomaly of enforcing in one case the uniform federal
law fashioned in the courts and applied throughout the nation, and on the
same issue in the next case enforcing awards of arbitrators at variance with
that law.
In Teamsters, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,27 the Supreme Court described
the necessity that the federal law fashioned under section 301 (a) should be para-
mount and uniform. While the Court was talking there about the pre-emption
of state law, the same considerations would seem to apply to awards of arbi-
trators. In the Lucas case the Court said:
It was apparently the theory of the Washington Court that, although
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, requires the fed-
eral courts to fashion, from the policy of our national labor laws, a body
of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,
nonetheless, the courts of the States remain free to apply individualized
local rules when called upon to enforce such agreements. This view cannot
be accepted. The dimensions of section 301 require the conclusion that
substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the
area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process
by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills,
requiring issues raised in suits of a kind covered by section 301 to be
decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy.
More important, the subject matter of section 301 (a) "is peculiarly
one that calls for uniform law." Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569, see Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315
U.S. 148, 167-169. The possibility that individual contract terms might
have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably
exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administra-
tion of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of
the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating
an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity
of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the
same meaning under two or more systems of law which might someday
be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargain was
made, the possibility of conflicting substantive- interpretation under com-
peting legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as
to its interpretation.
28
For the last proposition the Court cites Professor Wellington's article, Labor
and the Federal System, in which he says:
Words in any lekal document are ambiguous, but the body of law which
grows up in an area through decision helps to dispel this ambiguity. The
24. United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1959).
25. Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1963),
26. Retail Clerks Union v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 327 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1964).
27. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
28. Id. at 103-04.
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existence of two bodies of law which cannot be accommodated by any
conflict-of-laws rule, however, is calculated to aggravate rather than to
alleviate the situation.P
I shall content myself with citing observations by two commentators on
this problem. The first is by Katz:
To say that federal substantive law "is not controlling in an arbitration
proceeding," does not dispose of the problem any more than the fact that
courts do not vacate arbitration awards because of mistakes of law should
not result in license to ignore the law. Even if one assumes, arguendo,
that an arbitrator is not required in interpreting collective bargaining
agreements to follow substantive law the question still remains as to
whether the arbitrator should do so as a matter of good conscience and
wisdom. An undesirable, potentially dangerous situation results if the
parties to a labor contract are made to understand that grievances would
be resolved differently, and by a different kind of law, depending on the
forum - one result if by arbitration, another if enforced through the
courts. Such a result is abhorrent to a well ordered legal system, yet it
is the certain effect of the United Packers rationale. Does it make any
sense for parties to have to abandon arbitration clauses in order to en-
joy the benefits of uniform substantive lav relating to collective bar-
gaining agreements. 30
Smith says:
If, for example, a Webster-type case concerning the question of the
existence of an implied restriction on subcontracting should reach the
Supreme Court, and the Court should construe the "union shop" clause
as did the Seventh Circuit (as giving rise to an implied prohibition on
subcontracting), could such a decision properly be disregarded by an
arbitrator even though he disagrees with it? If one regards such a de-
cision by the Court only as indicating its view of the implications deriving
from some clause in the labor agreement - that is, that the Court, like
the arbitrator, is simply interpreting the agreement which is before it -
the clear answer is that the arbitrator can disagree, and should disagree,
if some other interpretation seems to him to be proper.
If, on the other hand, one regards such a decision by the Court as
meaning that a provision or provisions of the labor agreement have
certain meanings and implications as a matter of federal substantive
law, or as controlling indications of the parties' intent, the ultimate
question in terms of the arbitration process is whether an arbitrator is
bound to accept and apply such views in order to render an award which
is not subject to being set aside. Orthodox analysis would indicate a
negative answer, since it is assumed the arbitrator has the power to
make an incorrect as well as a correct decision, even on a question of
law. But I suggest that we are here involved in an area of special diffi-
culty in view of the ultimate control which the federal judiciary has
over the arbitration process, the role ascribed to it in developing a federal
law concerning the labor agreement, and the disposition of the Supreme
29. 26 U. CHL L. REv-. 542, 557 (1959).
30. Katz, Discussion of Feinberg, Do Contract Rights Vest?, in LAoia . a .nTRAo.n
AN, INDusTRAL CIANGE 192, 230-31 (1963) ; see also Jay, Arbitration and the Federal
Common Law of Collective Agreentents, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 448 (1962).
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Court, evident in areas such as the delineation of federal and state au-
thority, to regard as desirable a pattern of national uniformity of labor
law.31
At another point there is an even sharper clash between the arbitration
process and the courts. It can be illustrated by reference to Local 721, United
Packing House Workers v. Needham Packing Co.,3 2 decided last year by
the Supreme Court. In that case the union sued to compel arbitration of its
claims for the reinstatement and back pay of striking employees. The em-
ployer counterclaimed for damages arising from the strike. The Court held
that the parties must proceed with the arbitration while the employer pur-
sues his damage suit in court. What will be the result if the arbitrator and
the court reach different conclusions? The Supreme Court expressly refused
to pass upon what it called the "effect, if any, factual or legal determination
of an arbitrator would have on a related action in the courts," referring to
its footnote in Atkinson v. Sinclair,3 3 in which it put aside, as unnecessary to
reach, the question "whether the underlying factual or legal determination,
made by an arbitrator in the process of awarding or denying reimbursement
to 14 employees, would bind either the union or the company in the latter's
action for damages against the union in the district court." One must first
remark about these footnotes that the Court says nothing of any questions
which might be raised if the district court should decide the damage action
first. It is hard to believe that the failure to mention this possibility means
that a district court's holding that the union is liable in damages for breach
of the collective agreement would be voided by an arbitrator's subsequent
holding that the strike was not a breach of the agreement. Perhaps it is so
clear that an arbitrator would be bound by such a determination that the
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to mention it. But the suggestion that
an arbitrator's determination might be res judicata with respect to a subse-
quent court action raises a number of questions. It is at least clear that if
such a doctrine were to be adopted, courts would be obligated to scrutinize
arbitration awards much more closely.
On the issue of the possible res judicata effect of an arbitration award on
a subsequent suit for damages for strikes in breach of contract, the reluctance
of arbitrators to become involved in such damage suits should be considered.
Professor Aaron says:
[D] etermination whether there has been a strike or stoppage of work
proscribed by the no-strike clause, and, if so, whether any legal justifi-
cation for such strike or work stoppage exists, can hardly be said to be
"not normal" or "foreign to the competence" of the courts. Indeed, even
when that determination is intrusted to an arbitrator, his "source of
law," like that of the courts, is likely to be "confined to the express pro-
visions of the contract." . . . Of course, if the arbitration provision
31. Smith, Arbitrators and Arbitrability, in LAoit ARDITRATION AND INDUSTIAL
CHANGE 75, 93 (1963).
32. 376 U.S. 247, 253 & n.5 (1964).
33. 370 U.S. 238, 245 & n.5 (1962).
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broadly includes "all grievances," and if the employer, as in the Drake
Bakeries case, is expressly given the right to file grievances and appeal
them to arbitration, it may be argued that his claim that the union has
violated the no-strike clause should be handled in the same manner as
any other grievance .... But that argument overlooks several important
considerations. First, the assessment of damages for breach of contract
is not a normal function of arbitrators and is only rarely provided for
in collective agreements . . . . Thus, in the usual case, the arbitrator
would lack the authority - to say nothing of the informed judgment - to
determine the measure of damages, even though he found that the union
had violated the no-strike clause . . . . Second, the arbitrator's award
is not self-enforcing. The employer would thus be put to the additional
trouble of securing his damages by court action after he had won his
case on the merits in arbitration .... Therefore, absent specific language
in the agreement giving the arbitrator jurisdiction over claims that the
no-strike clause had been violated, it would seem that considerations of
fairness and common sense favor determination of that issue and the
getting of appropriate relief in the nature of damages by the courts.3
And Professor Fleming says:
Even when punitive damages are not sought arbitrators may do well
to decline, when the absence of specific authorizing language permits, to
enter the field of damage actions traditionally reserved for the courts.
In a 1958 case, for instance, Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation sought
through arbitration to re-claim expenses which it was obliged to carry
through an alleged illegal strike. Arbitrator Crawford found that the
union did violate the no-strike clause but he declined to award damages
on the theory that the contract did not expressly authorize damages and
in the absence of such authorization damage suits were for the courts.
[Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 1061 (1958). "The con-
templated and normally effective contractual remedy available to the
Company is discharge of the leaders of the wildcat strike," said Crawford.
(Id. at 1064).] If and when the damage issue arises in the Drake Bakeries
arbitration the arbitrator will presumably be free to take the same posi-
tion: that the parties did not contemplate damage claims before the ar-
bitrator, and that such suits are for the courts. There would appear to
be no reason why the company could not then reinstitute its court suit.
If such a position could be established before arbitrators, it would mean
that damages typically associated in the past with court suits would be
sought from arbitartors only when it was clear that the contract intended
to authorize such actions. Runaway shop cases, which do seem to call
for a damage remedy at the hands of the arbitrator, would still be taken
care of by specific authorizations. . . . Otherwise, policy considerations
suggest that arbitrators will be wise to involve themselves as little as
possible in the court-type damage actions.mr
Smith has been franker as to the motive of the arbitrators' reluctance to
pass upon the issue of the strike in breach of a collective agreement:
Some arbitrators seem to feel that their "life expectancy" in terms of
future acceptability would be jeopardized by performing their inevitable
34. Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy, 9 U.C.LA.L
Rzv. 360, 366-67 (1962).
35. Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L Rzv. 1199, 1221 (1962).
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duty, if jurisdiction is assumed, of imposing what might be very heavy
monetary penalties upon their good union customers. They would prefer
to leave this distasteful task to the courts .... 83
It has been held that when a union delays unduly its motion to stay a damage
action for a strike in breach of contract pending arbitration, it waives its
right to have the issue arbitrated.
3 7
Another procedure by which it has been suggested that the courts may limit
arbitration is the declaratory judgment.88 The great weight of authority holds
that declaratory judgments may be secured under section 301.1o If one party
to a collective bargaining agreement seeks a declaratory judgment, it may be
that the other party will be unable to secure a stay pending arbitration, be-
cause the activity complained of has not yet ripened into a grievance tinder the
contract. Thus it would be possible to secure a declaratory judgment with
respect to a violation of the agreement which might be binding on the parties,
regardless of arbitration, if a violation subsequently occurred.
Aside from the area of actions under section 301 there are a number of
other situations in which courts are called upon to pass on violations of col-
lective bargaining agreements. For example, it has been held that by review
de novo the courts have the power of final determination with respect to griev-
ances under contracts which are covered by the Railway Labor Act and de-
cided by the National Railroad Adjustment Board.40 Moreover, cases of
wrongful discharge under Railway Labor Act contracts in which the employee
elects to accept the discharge and seek damages are tried by the courts in
the first instance.4 ' The federal courts also review orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission with respect to seniority.2 And, where any employer
is in bankruptcy, it has been held that the court rather than an arbitrator will
determine claims arising under the collective bargaining agreement.48
While the National Labor Relations Board pays great deference to arbi-
tration awards, there are situations in which the Board will not honor the
award because it is "repugnant to the purposes and policies of the [National
36. Smith, Arbitrators and Arbitrability, in LABon ARBITRATION AND INDUST]A,
CHANGE 75, 95 (1963).
37. E. T. Simonds Constr. Co. v. Local 1330, Int'l Hod Carriers Union, 315 F.2d
291 (7th Cir. 1963).
38. See Fleming, Some Observations on Contract Grievances Before Courts and Arbi.
trators, 15 STAN. L. REv. 595, 601-03 (1963), citing Local 408, UAW v. Crescent Brass
& Pin Co., 46 L.R.R.M. 2975, 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 16760 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
39. See Jay, Arbitration and the Federal Common Law of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 448, 452-53 n.20 (1962).
40. Brotherhood of R-R. Trainmen v. Louisville & N.R.R,, 334 F.2d 79 (5th Cir,
1964) ; Jones v. Central of Ga. Ry., 331 F2d 649 (5th Cir. 1964).
41. Martin v. Southern Ry., 136 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 1964).
42. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 314 F.2d 424 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963).
43. Muskegon Motor Specialities Co. v. Davis, 313 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1963). It in
not clear whether the court must determine claims or whether it can, at its discretion, allow
arbitration to assume this responsibility. See the last paragraph (Id. at 843), which favors
the view advanced in the text
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Labor Relations] Act."'' For example, the Board refused to defer to an
award which upheld the discharge of certain employees for having caused
a work stoppage in violation of a collective agreement; the Board found that
the activities of the employees were protected activities under the AcL45 In
two other cases the Board refused to defer to awards because it found that
the charges on the basis of which the employees involved were discharged
were a "pretext" covering a discharge for union activity, and that the arbi-
trator had not considered that issue.46
It is possible for the courts to enter such cases in either of two ways. The
party who is not satisfied with the results of the arbitration may go to the
courts, rather than to the Board, to have the award set aside. It would seem
to me to be the duty of the court to set aside any award to which the Board
would not defer. Second, a case in which the Board honored an arbitration
award may come to the court for review after having been passed upon by
the Board. The court would then, I believe, have the duty of carefully examin-
ing the award to see to it that the result reached by the Board was in accord
with the federal law.
In addition to the limited power of the courts to intervene on the issue of
arbitrability and, as is suggested, their somewhat broader power on the issue
of the arbitrator's authority, there are a number of other points at which the
courts may be called upon to enter the arbitration process.
The basic validity of the collective bargaining agreement is surely an
issue for the courts, not for arbitrators. 47 Thus courts can deny a petition
to enforce an award or an agreement to arbitrate on the grounds, for example,
of fraud, or of duress in the making of the basic agreement. Obviously, how-
ever expert arbitrators may be thought to be with respect to the substantive
provisions of collective agreements, there is no reason to ascribe to them any
special expertise on ordinary and usual contract issues which are handled
by the courts in their regular course. Not only is it for courts rather than
arbitrators to decide whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, but it
is also the courts' function to decide whether there was a subsequent agree-
ment withdrawing an issue from arbitration. 4
Certain types of claims, such as claims arising under pension agreements
and insurance claims, have been held not to be covered by the arbitration
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement 40 When it is said that
44. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
45. Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1462 (1961).
46. Monsanto Chemical Co., 130 N.LR.B. 1097 (1961); Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
883 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
47. Smith, Arbitrators and Arbitrability, in LABOR AnrraRA~oz AND InDUSTriAL
C .LaE 75 (1963).
48. Local 149, Boot Workers v. Faith Shoe Co, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 18260
(MD. Pa. 1963).
49. See, e.g., American Bosch Anna Corp. v. Stewart, 20 App. Div. 2d 576, 246
N.Y.S.2d 103 (1963), leave to appeal granted, 14 N.Y.2d 485, 200 N.E.2d 220, 251
N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1964).
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something is not subject to the arbitration clause, what we ordinarily mean
is that the subject matter is within the power of management and that the
union has no right to question it. However, when we say that pension and
insurance claims are not subject to arbitration clause, we mean here& that
they are subject to action in the courts. A number of recent cases have been
concerned with such claimsP0 Clearly this is another area in which arbitrators
can have no claim to superior expertise.
In two recent cases the meaning of clauses excluding certain matters from
arbitration has been carefully examined by the respective courts, both of
which came to the conclusion that the unions' claims were intended to be
excluded.r' In Collins Radio Co. the Fifth Circuit said:
That which the parties have committed to the arbiter is for the arbiter
alone, not the Court. Courts musf assure that. But it is equally important
to assure that neither party - through one guise or another - may
obtain the intervention of an arbiter when the contract clearly excludes
it from the reach of the grievance machinery.
5 2
It has also been held that awards are not enforceable when they cover items
not included in the submission agreement . 3 In Local 784, Truck Drivers Union
v. Ulry-Talbert Co.r4 the Eighth Circuit gave effect to a contract clause pro-
hibiting the arbitrator from substituting his judgment for that of manage-
ment. The court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in reducing
the penalty of discharge to suspension without pay.5
While United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co,50 may be
read as requiring arbitration even when the issue to be arbitrated is not men-
tioned in the collective agreement, at least three recent cases, two of them cases
involving, as did Warrior, contracting out 57 have held the contrary. In one
of these cases the court said:
50. See Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
964 (1964) (pension eligibility); UAW v. Textron Inc., 312 F.2d 688 (6th Cir.
"1963) (employees' rights in a pension fund); Hudson v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1963) (rights to credits on books of insurance com-
pany).
51. Communications Workers v. New York Tel. Co., 327 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.
1964); Local 787, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Collins Radio Co., 317 F.2d 214
(5th Cir. 1963).
52. 317 F.2d at 220.
53. In re Local 295, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 149 N.Y.L.J., April 1,
1963, p. 16 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1963); Kansas City Luggage Workers v. Neevel Lug-
gage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1964).
54. 330 F2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964).
55. 330 F.2d 562, 564-65. See also Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 291
F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
56. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
57. Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324 F.2d 903 (7th
Cir. 1963), aff'd by an equally divided court, 379 U.S. 130 (1964) (contracting out);
Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 49 C.CH. Lab, Cas.
11 51076 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (contracting out); Local 30, Philadelphia Leather
Workers v. Hyman Brodsky & Son Corp., 49 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 1 18987 (E.D. Pa.
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[T]he plaintiff has not been able to point to any provision in the contract
that it seeks to have applied or interpreted, and from an examination
of it, I find no provision that could be applied or interpreted. As a result,
I cannot find that the parties have agreed to arbitrate this matter r9
In H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw), File and Stccl Workcrsu a Third
Circuit case, eligibility for pensions had been held to be an arbitrable issue
and the parties had proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrator decided, inter alia,
that proportionate pensions should be paid to those sixty-five years of age
or over who had less than 25 years of work for the company. The court
in setting aside this part of the award said:
That the Company was moving its plant to a new location may have
invoked hardship on older employees. Yet, absent any provision either
explicitly or implicitly authorizing the Arbitrator's ruling in Part 2 of
his award, or any prior practice which reasonably could so interpret it,
he lacked a basis for his conclusion. As already stated, the Arbitrator
may not administer his own brand of industrial justice.
We find that in Part 2 of the award the Arbitrator had no ground
upon which to base his interpretation of the clear and unambiguous
words of the eligibility clause. Standing by itself, it gave him no room
to construe it in any manner than according to its plain meaning. Bereft
of any practice evidencing a relaxation of the requirement of years of
total service and relying only upon age, the Arbitrator was unjustified
in deviating from the plain mandate of the eligibility clause, as it con-
cerned those who fulfilled only the portion making the age of sL\ty-five
a requirement. Indeed, such an interpretation neither goes to the essence
nor to the application of the collective bargaining agreement.c"
Grace Line v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n,0t a state case, pre-
sents in its results a contrast to the Porter Company case just cited. In the
Grace Line case the collective agreement provided that severance pay should
be paid when a vessel was transferred to foreign registry. Because of the mean-
mng of the words "severance pay," it is obvious that the contractual clause
was to be read as providing severance pay for employees who lost their
jobs as the result of transfer of a vessel to foreign registry. However, an
-arbitrator without legal training awarded severance pay to employees of
two ships which were laid up for three years and then transferred to foreign
registry, even though the employees had been transferred to new ships of
the same name at the time the original vessels were laid up. Thus the award
gavie severance pay to employees whose employment had never for an instant
1964) (claim for severance pay not arbitrable where contract did not cover such
matters).
58. Local 30, Philadelphia Leather Workers v. Hyman Brodsky & Son Corp,
supra note 57, at 31489.
59. 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964).
60. Id. at 602.
61. 38 ' Misc. 2d 909, 239 N.Y.Sl2d 293 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd mcmn, 20 App.
Div. 2d 759, 246 N.Y.S2d 994, leave to appeal denied, 14 N.Y.2d 484, 250 N.Y.S2d
1026 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
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been severed. The New York court, believing that it was bound by a recent
New York statute providing that the court "shall not consider whether the
claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise
pass upon the merits of the dispute," 62 refused to set aside the award, though
it said: "The award renders a disservice to the cause of both arbitration and
collective bargaining."' 3 The court should have decided the case under federal
law rather than under New York law. If it had done so the result should
have been different.
In addition to the more general grounds for court intervention, there are
a few situations in which the courts may act, which, though limited, are of
sufficient importance to deserve some mention. Courts have refused in a few
cases to enforce awards on the ground that the awards contravened public
policy. For example, the Supreme Court of California refused to enforce an
award ordering the reinstatement of a Communist employee. Holding that
the award was contrary to the public policy expressed in a statute providing
a penalty for refusing to transmit messages,65 the New York Court of Appeals
refused to enforce an award setting aside the disciplinary suspension of em-
ployees of a telegraph company who refused to handle messages emanating
from a struck company.66 In another case, 67 the New York Appellate Division,
refusing on the ground of public policy to enforce an award which included
penalty damages, stated:
The trouble with an arbitration admitting a power to grant unlimited
damages by way of punishment is that if the court treated such an award
in the way arbitration awards are usually treated, and followed the award
to the letter, it would amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial power. 8
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to enforce an agreement
to arbitrate the discharge of employees who during a strike against a gas com-
pany had broken into a meter room and removed some gas meters.60 And a
lower Connecticut court vacated on public policy grounds an award reinstating
an employee who had been discharged for gambling on the premises of the em-
ployer.70 Some federal courts have also affirmed the role of public policy in
62. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1448-a (effective Apr. 9, 1962), now superseded by N.Y.
CivIL PRAcT cE LAw AND RuLms [referred to hereinafter as N.Y. CPLR] § 7501 (effective
Sept. 1, 1963).
63. 38 Misc. 2d 909, 914, 239 N.Y.S.2d 293, 298-99.
64. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), Petition for
cert. dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
65. N.Y. PENAL LAw 552.
66. Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86
N.E2d 162 (1949).
67. Publishers Ass'n v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers Union, 280 App. Div. 500,
114 N.Y.S2d 401 (1952).
68. Id. at 404.
69. Public Utility Constr. Workers v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 26 N.J. 145, 139
A.2d 1 (1958).
70. Avco Corp. v. Preteska, 22 Conn. Supp. 475, 174 A2d 684 (Super. Ct. 1961).
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review of arbitration awards. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
for example, though granting enforcement, stated in Local 453, Intl Union
of Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co.:
It is no less true in suits brought under section 301 to enforce arbi-
tration awards than in other lawsuits that the "power of the federal
courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times exer-
cised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of
the United States.. . " Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35... (1948).
The public policy to be enforced as a part of the substantive principles
of federal labor law which federal courts, under the mandate of Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 ... (1957),
are empowered to fashion. Cf. Local 174, Teamsters, etc. v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 ... (1962). Thus, when public policy is sought to be
interposed as a bar to enforcement of an arbitration award, a court must
evaluate its asserted content.7 1
Finally, it should be noted that in its original form the Uniform Arbitration
Act contained a clause providing for vacation of an award where the award
was contrary to public policy.7 - This provision, however, was adversely criti-
cized by the National Academy of Arbitrators, and the clause was strickenj 3
Closely related to public policy as a ground for refusing to enforce arbi-
tration awards, and similarly limited in scope, is the defense of illegality.
The Fourth Circuit, for example, recently denied enforcement of an award
on the ground that it ordered the employer to commit an unfair labor practice."
Aside from the various points at which courts may intervene on the merits,
there are also procedural aspects which justify refusal to enforce awards. The
United States Arbitration Act 75 provides for vacation of awards procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means. There are similar provisions in state
statutes. 76 The courts passing on arbitrations conducted under section 301 are
certain to reach the same result. In addition, the requirements of basic due
process will without doubt be held applicable to the arbitration procedure.
There is surely a requirement, for example, that the arbitrator not show
bias and prejudice. However informal the procedure may be - and some-
times the informality appears to border on anarchy - there are basic require-
ments of fairness upon which the courts will insist when asked to enforce
the awards. These requirements of procedural due process include adequate
notice and opportunity to defend, willingness on the part of the arbitrator
to hear all material evidence, and a requirement that the decision be based
on the record, not on ex parte investigation by the arbitrator. In a recent
71. Local 453, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F2d 25, 29
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
72. 24 Lab. Arb. 886, 887 (1955).
73. 27 Lab. Arb. 909, 910-11 (1957).
74. Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
75. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958).
76. N.Y. CPLR § 7511(b) (McKinney, 1963). In 1961 Illinois adopted the Uniform
Arbitration Act
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New York case the court vacated an award in which the arbitrator insisted
upon scheduling the hearing at a time when the employer and his lawyer
could not attend for what the court held good and sufficient reasons. 11 Jones
and Smith quote a union attorney as saying:
My most important concern is that arbitrators pay closer attention to
the procedural due process. I will predict that in the near future, a new
line of court attack on arbitration rulings will commence on procedural
due process grounds unless arbitrators pay greater attention to those
requirements. For example, some arbitrators seem to consider that rules
of evidence are useless technicalities to be scorned by broad-thinking
men. They forget that rules of evidence are usually based upon rules of
reason and if they continue to admit hearsay, wholly irrelevant matters,
and similar oddities, there will be difficulty ahead.78
One of the procedural problems which frequently arises is the receipt of
evidence from anonymous witnesses. Many enterprises such as retail stores
and bus companies hire investigators, or "spotters," to observe the employees
at work especially for the purpose of discovering instances of theft or other
dishonest practices. In order to preserve the usefulness of these special em-
ployees, the employers are unwilling to produce them as witnesses at arbi-
tration hearings. Yet an employer's case in support of disciplinary action taken
against an employee may rest wholly on the evidence given by a "spotter."
Courts will be asked to pass upon the question of whether such evidence
anonymously given is consonant with the requirements of due process. This
problem is closely related to another, that of surprise evidence. In the courts,
with discovery procedures freely available, there is no reason for anyone's
being surprised by evidence of which he had no knowledge prior to the hearing.
But the discovery procedures are not available in arbitration. Due process
may require that the arbitrator adjourn the hearing to give a party an oppor-
tunity to prepare to meet evidence which has taken him by surprise, and the
courts may vacate awards in situations in which the arbitrator denied such
an adjournment. Another complaint against arbitrators is "their being willing
to listen ad nauseam" 79 to completely irrelevant evidence. This is unfair to
the opposing party who feels that he must meet this irrelevant material.
In a recent case involving due process, the California Supreme Court faced
a three party representation situation in which the arbitrator had purported
in his award to affect the rights of a third party who had not been a party
to the arbitration or to the agreement to arbitrate.80 The third party claimed
to be the employer of the employees whom the union claimed to represent.
The arbitrator held, in a proceeding which did not include the second employer,
that the employees were represented by the union. The second employer was
77. Farkash v. Brach, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 50773 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
78. Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitra.
tion Process: A Report with Comments, 62 Mica. L. REv. 1115, 1127 (1964).
79. Id. at 1130.




permitted to intervene in the court proceeding and, in an opinion by Judge
Traynor, prevailed in having the award vacated on due process grounds -
on the ground that the arbitrator had issued an award purporting to bind a
third party who was not only not a party to the agreement to arbitrate, but
who had taken no part in the arbitration.
The situation in which the dearest case is made for judicial intervention
to vacate an award on the ground of public policy is the rigged award. Un-
fortunately this is the very situation which is least likely to come to the court's
attention. In the first place, since the rigged award is one to which both
sides have consented, no recourse will be had to the courts. Moreover the
success of the rigged award depends entirely upon the conspiracy being kept
secret, so that those who would object to the position taken by the parties
are unaware that they have "requested" the award. The impossibility of de-
tecting the rigged award means that, insofar as the courts are participants in
general in the arbitration process, they are being used as unwitting accom-
plices to this skullduggery. It raises most emphatically the question of what
preferential treatment arbitration should receive.
Procedural irregularities may also cause the National Labor Relations
Board to reject an arbitration award. The NLRB has stated that it will defer
to awards where the arbitration "proceedings appear to have been fair and
regular, all parties have agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration
panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the [National
Labor Relations] Act.""' The Board has refused to honor an award where
a discharged employee was not permitted to be accompanied at the hearing
by his counsel,82 and in another case, where an employee received notice of
the arbitration hearing only two days before the hearing which was held only
four days after the discharge. Of course the Board would refuse to honor
a rigged award if by some chance it learned of the rigging.
When picketing first reached the Supreme Court, that Court, in an opinion
characterized by somewhat extravagant language, held in effect that picketing
was a form of free speech.83 With the passage of time, as the real nature of
picketing became clearer to the Court, the Court gradually receded from its
original position. Today picketing is subject to broad regulation by both na-
tional and state legislatures and courts. It may be that, as the courts become
more familiar with the real nature of the arbitration process, they will like-
wise recede from the more extreme positions respecting arbitration. A reading
of Dean Shulman's famous lecture84 and a selective reading from some of
81. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
82. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd., 123 N.L.R.B. 395, rcnanded on other grounds, 274
F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
83. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
84. Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L Rav. 999
(1955). See, e.g, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579-80
(1960).
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Archibald Cox's work does not provide a sufficient basis for a judgment as
to the character of the arbitration process. Since labor arbitration plays such
an important role in our system of justice, it is incumbent upon the scholars
to make more extensive and careful studies of the process than have yet
appeared. On the basis of these studies we must have disinterested evaluations
of the process as a whole. Too much of the material which is now available
consists of enthusiastic endorsement of arbitration by arbitrators who are
making a living from it, or by organizations seeking to advance the cause of
arbitration.
In the meantime, until the courts can get a more realistic picture of the
whole process, there are a number of points at which the courts can legiti-
mately intervene, and some courts have been scrutinizing arbitration more
closely at these points. Moreover, Congress has entrusted to the judiciary
the task of fashioning the law governing the collective bargaining agreement.
As courts pursue this task, they are bound to come into ever greater conflict
with the arbitration process and will be forced by the necessity for uniformity
to develop some kind of resolution of this conflict.
Pending scholarly studies and evaluations, I am forced to the conclusion,
based upon observation during twenty-three years of very active practice
in the area of arbitration and as an arbitrator, and from suggestions in the
more intelligent literature in this field, that labor arbitration has fatal short-
comings as a system for the judicial administration of contract violations. I
call labor arbitration "a system for the judicial administration of contract
violations," since this is, I believe, all that is basically claimed for it. An
arbitrator is a third party called in to determine a controversy over whether
one of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement has violated that
agreement. He is not a wise counsellor and statesman to whom the manage-
ment and the union look for advice on how to run their affairs or how to
increase production or lessen tensions. He is merely an ad hoc judge to whom
is submitted the question of whether the collective bargaining agreement has
been violated. The chances are very good that, in all but a tiny percentage
of arbitrations, this is the first time he has had anything to do with the plant,
and that he knows nothing of the background of the dispute or of the "com-
mon law" of the industry. In fact there is a considerable possibility that this
is his first arbitration case. He does not in fact have any expertise in these
matters and is not actually expected to have any, since it is expected that he
will listen to the evidence presented by the two parties and decide on the basis
of that evidence whether the charge of contract violation is or is not sustained.
For his task he requires exactly the same expertise which judges have and
use every day. He must be expert in analyzing issues, in weighing evidence,
and in contract interpretation.
There are only a handful of arbitrators who, like Shulman and Cox, have
the knowledge, training, skill, and character which would make them good
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judges and therefore make them good arbitrators. In literally thousands of
cases every year decisions are made by arbitrators who are wholly unfitted
for their jobs, who do not have the requisite knowledge, training, skill, in-
telligence and character. In fact, a proportion of arbitration awards, no one
knows how large a proportion, is decided not on the basis of the evidence or
of the contract or other proper considerations, but in a way calculated to
encourage the arbitrator's being hired for other arbitration cases. It makes
no difference whether or not a large majority of cases is decided in this way.
A system of adjudication in which the judge depends for his livelihood, or for
a substantial part of his livelihood or even for substantial supplements to
his regular income, on pleasing those who hire him to judge is per se a thor-
oughly undesirable system. In no proper system of justice should a judge be
submitted to such pressures; on the contrary, a judge should be carefully
insulated from any pressure of this type. There are many discussions of arbi-
tration which do not mention this aspect of the process. In my opinion no dis-
cussion of arbitration which does not consider the effect of the arbitrator's
dependence on the good will of the parties is completely honest.
It is my view that intervention by the courts, even if a broad intervention
should be permitted, is not a sufficient answer to the shortcomings of labor
arbitration. I believe that the courts should not lend themselves at all to the
arbitration process. Labor arbitration is a private system of justice not based
on law and not observant of law. There is no reason why it should be able
to call upon the legal system to enforce its decrees. On the contrary, there
are positive reasons for the courts not exercising their enforcement powers
in favor of arbitration. We know that a large proportion of the awards of
arbitrators are rendered by incompetents, that another proportion, we do
not know how large but are permitted by the circumstances to suspect that
it is quite substantial, are rendered not on the basis of any proper concerns,
but rather on the basis of what award would be best for the arbitrator's future.
We know also that there is another group of cases, though it is true that the
courts are not called upon for enforcement in such cases, in which the arbi-
trator has rendered a rigged award, a practice so vicious as to be unacceptable
in any system of justice.
In his lecture Dean Shulman suggested that "the law stay out" of irbi-
tration. While his reasons for such a conclusion are quite different from mine,
I wish to make the same suggestion - that the law get out of labor arbitra-
tion and leave the procedure exclusively to the voluntary action of the parties.
In this way those who believe that labor arbitration is a praiseworthy system
of industrial justice will be able to have such a system working on its highest
level, the level Shulman described and advocated. Those who believe, as I
do, that labor arbitration is a usually undesirable and frequently intolerable
procedure will not be offended by the requirement that our courts rubber
stamp the questionable results which the arbitrators have reached.
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No one envisaged labor arbitration as a complete and very extensive system
of private justice when the arbitration statutes were adopted. Nobody thought
of a system in which people earned a living by conducting arbitrations. It is
even doubtful whether the United States Arbitration Act has any application
to labor arbitration, but in any event, it was not designed to cover labor
arbitration as it has developed, and the sponsors of the Act did not have in
mind any such system as has grown up.
Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, so often
quoted as indicating a national policy in favor of arbitration, says nothing of
court enforcement, and may be read in fact to favor the courts' keeping out
of the procedure. Section 203(d) provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement.85
The section then goes on to direct the Mediation and Conciliation Service to
make its services available in grievance disputes "only as a last resort and
in exceptional cases." This provision thus expresses a strong policy in favor
of purely voluntary adjustment by the parties. The interference of courts in
the process may be thought of as just as much contrary to the policy set forth
as is the interference of the Mediation and Conciliation Service. The principle
for which the section appears to stand is the principle of "hands off" by gov-
ernment agencies of whatever sort.
We may also assume that the intervention of courts has a much wider
affect than that upon litigants in cases in which the courts actually play a role.
The availability of resort to the courts must serve in countless situations to
persuade reluctant parties to collective agreements to accept arbitration and
to abide by awards. We are, therefore, not considering merely those com-
paratively few cases which now get into the courts, but also the thousands
of cases which are now settled by reluctant acquiescence to arbitration without
resort to the courts.
If the use of the courts for the purpose of enforcing arbitration were
withdrawn, it would of course leave the courts available for the enforce-
menf of collective bargaining agreements through regular judicial procedures.
Yet to make arbitration purely voluntary would entail, as I see it, refusal
to give effect to an arbitration clause as a defense to an action in the courts,
as well as the refusal of affirmative action for the enforcement of a promise
to arbitrate. For voluntary arbitration to be effective the parties to the col-
lective bargaining agreement must be genuinely willing to carry out the agree-
ment to arbitrate without outside pressure from any official source.
There are certain procedural advantages in arbitration which some would
want to see preserved. There is nothing about those procedures which makes
85. 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1958).
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them indissolubly a part of a private system of judicial administration. They
could all be readily adapted to a public system of justice and made available
in our courts.
For those who believe, for example, that a special expertise in labor prob-
lems is desirable for those Who pass upon violations of collective bargaining
agreements, there is the suggestion that we set up in this country a system
of labor courts after the model which has been so successful in countries like
Germany, Sweden, and Denmark.8 0 Such courts could be operated with a
simplified procedure, like the procedure in small claims courts, so that cases
could readily be presented by personnel managers or union representatives
without the necessity of being represented by counsl. On the other hand, the
courts would be equipped to hear complex cases as well as simple ones and
to give full scope to representation by counsel.
Specialized labor courts could of course be given jurisdiction to hear labor
relations problems other than actions for breach of collective agreements.
What these cases might be has been suggested in connection with prior pro-
posals for labor courts, but I seem to have enough controversy on my hands
here without venturing any further into that question.
As I have made clear, I do not believe that any expertise other than that
of judges in general is required for the resolution of controversies over col-
lective bargaining agreements. I would be content, therefore, with a procedural
reform which would make available for such cases a simple, speedy, and in-
expensive remedy. If the suggestion of a procedure like that of a small claims
court does not satisfy these requirements, then I suggest as an alternative
a procedure along the lines of the New York Simplified Procedure for Court
Determination of Disputes.s7 That procedure could be specified in the col-
lective bargaining agreement, and the promise to submit to it would be spe-
cifically enforceable. The action is commenced without the service of a sum-
mons and without pleadings by the filing of a statement setting forth the
issues ("claims and defenses"). A submission to this simplified procedure
constitutes a waiver of trial by jury. At the hearing, rules as to the admissi-
bility of evidence are dispensed with. The court may hold a pre-trial hearing
and may direct pre-trial discovery and the taking of depositions. Although the
New York simplified procedure permits no appeal, I would allow appeals in
this area upon permission of the Court of Appeals.
This procedure has all the advantages of arbitration plus certain procedural
advantages, like discovery, which are not available in arbitration. In addition
it has the advantage of being presided over by a judge who is trained and
skilled, who is a part of the judicial tradition, and who is protected by tenure.
The judgments will be judgments in accordance with the law of collective
86. See Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticiins of the
Arbitration Process: A Report ath Comments, 62 Mica. L. REv. 1115, 1122 & n.11
(1964).
87. N.Y. CPLR §§ 3031-37 (McKinney, 1963).
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bargaining agreements as that law is being fashioned by the courts. This law
will be uniform throughout the nation, as Congress intended it to be.
Perhaps I will be accused of stirring up trouble where none has existed.
I plead in my own defense that I am deeply committed to the integrity of our
court system and that I do not believe that judges should stand idly by and
let that court system be used as the handmaiden for a system of private adju-
dication which has as many fatal shortcomings as has labor arbitration.
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